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On a planet experiencing global environmental change, the gover-
nance of natural resources depends on sustained collective action
by diverse populations. Engaging in such collective action can
only build upon the foundation of human cognition in social–
ecological settings. To help understand this foundation, we assess
the effect of cognitive abilities on the management of a com-
mon pool resource. We present evidence that two functionally
distinct cognitive abilities, general and social intelligence, improve
the ability of groups to manage a common pool resource. Groups
high in both forms of intelligence engage in more effective collec-
tive action that is also more consistent, despite social or ecological
change. This result provides a foundation for integrating the
effects of cognitive abilities with other dimensions of cognitive
diversity to explain when groups will and will not sustainably
govern natural resources.
collective action | cognition | common pool resources | theory of mind
The evolution of collective action beyond close kin is a hall-mark of human society (1). Yet, although collective action to
manage natural resources can persist for centuries (2), collective
action also sometimes fails, spectacularly (3). Understanding why
is critical on a planet where people from different backgrounds
must cooperate to adapt to global environmental change (4).
For example, reducing CO2 emissions requires many individu-
als from diverse backgrounds to reduce, at a short-term personal
cost, their use of fossil fuels to maintain a more suitable climate,
a societal benefit, for future generations. Engaging in collective
action at such a large scale can only build upon the foundation
of human cognition in social–ecological settings. To help under-
stand this foundation, we investigate the effects of general and
social intelligence on the ability of groups to act collectively to
solve a sustainability challenge.
Sustainability challenges often require collective action by
groups with different background experiences (e.g., Swedish
vs. American culture), modes of inquiry (e.g., visual–spatial
vs. verbal representations of the world), and preferences (e.g.,
maximize income vs. minimize suffering) to solve problems. Dif-
ferences in experiences, modes of inquiry, and preferences are
all dimensions of a social group’s cognitive diversity (5). Cogni-
tive diversity, in this sense, describes the configuration of social
groups along one or more of the above dimensions. Studies of
cognitive diversity, across disciplines, converge on a key insight.
Diverse experiences and modes of inquiry (but not necessarily
preferences) have positive net benefits for cooperation, learn-
ing, and problem solving among social groups (e.g., refs. 5–9).
This insight, however, is incomplete. The issue is that experi-
ences and modes of inquiry are framed as factors that explain
group performance better than cognitive abilities (5). A partic-
ularly pithy result indicates the following: Groups with diverse
predictive models make better predictions than smart (high-IQ)
groups (9). This framing obscures the fact that groups need mul-
tiple types of cognitive abilities—an underexplored dimension of
cognitive diversity—to solve complex problems and, importantly,
that levels of cognitive abilities should affect the capability of
groups to understand any given social–ecological setting. Thus,
in this paper, we fill an important knowledge gap by studying
the effects of general and social intelligence—two distinct types
of cognitive ability—on the capability of groups to solve a sus-
tainability challenge, and we use these results to hypothesize
how diverse experiences, modes of inquiry, and cognitive abil-
ities interact to affect the capability of social groups to solve
sustainability challenges.
All sustainability challenges require groups to model ecolog-
ical and social components of a system. For instance, in an
open access fishery, stakeholders must model how fish popula-
tions respond to external drivers, such as climate variation, to
make effective harvest decisions in terms of catch levels. Simi-
larly, stakeholders must model how other stakeholders will act
and their intentions to form a joint harvest goal that avoids
overfishing. Our basic proposition is that effective coopera-
tion to sustainably manage natural resources improves when
groups are configured with high levels of two distinct cogni-
tive abilities: general intelligence and social intelligence, theory
of mind in particular (10, 11). These cognitive abilities fun-
damentally affect the ability of groups to understand the eco-
logical and the social dimensions of sustainability challenges
and should, thus, affect the performance of groups in solving
such challenges.
Significance
Initiating large-scale collective action to sustain natural
resources is a key challenge in a world of global environ-
mental change. Research relevant to meeting this challenge
must assess the effects of human cognitive abilities on col-
lective action under multiple scenarios of social and ecolog-
ical change. This paper illustrates the importance of social
and general intelligence for solving a collective action prob-
lem. Groups high in general intelligence—useful for modeling
natural resources—and social intelligence—useful for mod-
eling social relationships—more effectively and consistently
learn to sustain natural resources in an experiment. Our
results shed light on the ability of groups/teams to solve
collective action problems under changing social–ecological
conditions.
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The specific abilities of spatial memory, valuation of rewards,
and executive control are critical to model the complex rules of
an ecological system, and one single factor explains a significant
amount of the variation in these abilities (general intelligence, g)
(12). Thus, g affects the ability to understand the rules of a
complex system, and groups higher in overall g should better
understand how to implement strategies that sustain natural
resources. Similarly, social–cognitive theory of mind (ToM ) is
a dimension of social intelligence that refers to the ability to
model what other individuals within a social group attend to
(i.e., beliefs about others’ locus of attention) (13, 14). In this
regard, ToM serves a distinct function: ToM allows one to pre-
dict how others will act in a given situation and develop shared
intentions.
In sum, we can conceive of the configuration of social
groups along two axes: a g and a ToM axis (Fig. 1A).
Groups with high g and high ToM should share better mod-
els of the ecological and social components of a system
and, thus, should make decisions that more consistently favor
higher levels of collective action to govern resources at risk
for overexploitation. Groups lower in one cognitive ability
or the other will display lower and less consistent perfor-
mance due to misunderstanding either the ecological patterns
or social situations that arise in a system. Elsewhere, we have
called this hypothesis the functional intelligences proposition
(FIP) (10, 11).
Several lines of evidence support the FIP. First, evidence sug-
gests that g and ToM measure distinct processes. For instance,
measures of g and ToM share very little variance among research
participants tested for both abilities (10, 15–17). Similarly, autis-
tic individuals with high g show a deficit in ToM (18), and
when such individuals attempt to model others’ attention, brain
regions associated with ToM remain inactive (18). Second, proxy
data for g and ToM strongly predict the performance of US state
governments at providing public goods, which requires sustained
collective action (11). Finally, in a limited set of common pool
resource experiments, groups high in both g and ToM display
the most effective collective action to sustain resources despite
unexpected negative changes to an ecological system (10). While
these studies hint that levels of g and ToM are partly inde-
pendent abilities important for groups to solve collective action
problems, the above studies ignore critical dimensions of social
change, including learning by doing and changes in group size.
Here, we provide a synthesis of the effects of g and ToM across
multiple contexts of social and ecological change in an experi-
mental setting. This synthesis provides a foundation to integrate
multiple cognitive abilities with more traditional studies of group
cognitive diversity.
To evaluate the effects of g and ToM across multiple con-
texts, we conducted four treatments of a controlled common
pool resource experiment. In each treatment, participants played
an anonymous multiplayer foraging game for six rounds (19)
and experienced an unexpected perturbation in round four
of the game. Two treatments simulate a negative perturba-
tion to the system that makes collective action more difficult
(a reduction in resource growth rate or an increase in group
size), and two treatments simulate a positive perturbation (an
increase in resource growth rate or a reduction in group size;
SI Appendix, section 1). In the experiment, the optimal strat-
egy for a group to harvest tokens, regardless of treatment, is
to let the tokens grow, without harvest, until very near the
end of a round and then harvest every last token just as time
expires. While sustaining the resource is necessary to maximize
the collection of tokens, sustaining the resource is not suffi-
cient for maximizing the harvest of tokens (i.e., groups may
leave tokens in the commons even though they do not carry
over from round to round). Measuring both types of perfor-
mance allows us to understand whether groups with different
levels of g and ToM prefer sustaining over maximizing resources
or vice versa.
To assess the governance of the resource we use four met-
rics. First, to estimate the sustainable governance of resources
we measure the proportion of time a group leaves tokens in the
commons during a round (Time). Second, to assess the consis-
tency of resource governance despite social–ecological changes
we measure the coefficient of variation of Time over rounds
two through six (CV Time). The greater the proportion of
time a group leaves tokens in the commons in a given round
or on average over all rounds (Mtime), the more effectively
they work together to sustain the resource. The less consistently
groups sustain tokens over rounds, the more sensitive they are to
social–ecological change. Third, we assess the ability of groups to
maximize token harvest (Tokens) and finally, we assess the con-
sistency of token maximization by measuring the coefficient of
variation of Tokens over rounds two through six (CV Tokens).
We estimate both the effectiveness of performance and the con-
sistency of performance (coefficient of variation) because the
FIP (11) suggests that groups high in both g and ToM should
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Fig. 1. (A) Heat map of the predicted effects of g and ToM on the mean performance of groups. Yellow indicates poor performance and red indicates high
performance (measured as either Mtime or Mtokens). (B) Path model of the effects of g and ToM on the sustainability of resource harvest in round one (R1)
and the consistency of sustainable harvest in rounds two to six. (C) Path model of the effects of g and ToM on the level of optimal harvest in round one and
the consistency of optimal harvest in rounds two to six. See SI Appendix, section 3 for analysis of the “control variables.” (D) Predicted learning curves in the
negative perturbation and positive perturbation treatments.
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not only more effectively engage in collective action but also do
so more consistently.
Six predictions guide our analysis. Prediction 1: g , on aver-
age, improves the ability of groups to engage in collective action
to sustain a common pool resource (Mtime) and maximize the
production of the resource (Mtokens). Higher average g means
better models of a resource’s dynamics (12). Understanding the
resource’s ecology is a cumulative task for a group: “I under-
stand X, and you understand Y”; together we understand X +
Y > X and X + Y > Y (20). Thus, groups that have better
average models of the resource should understand that to maxi-
mize their harvest, they must first sustain the resource (increasing
Mtime) and should also know to collapse the resource prior to
the end of a round to harvest more tokens (increasing Mtokens).
Prediction 2: Groups with all individuals high in ToM should
better model the intentions of other actors and better form the
joint goal of sustaining the resource. ToM affects social inter-
actions more critically than g , and this modeling ability is a
conjunctive task where the minimum level of ToM determines
the nature of the interaction within a group (20, 21). The col-
lective management of a common pool resource is a conjunctive
task because all members of a group must attend to the goal of
sustaining the resource. Thus, we expect that higher minimum
levels of ToM lead to groups better at forming a joint goal to
sustain the resource (increasing Mtime). Further, to maximize
the resource, groups must first sustain it. Thus, we expect ToM
to improve, on average, how well groups maximize the harvest of
resources (increasing Mtokens). Fig. 1A summarizes these two
predictions.
Prediction 3: G and ToM have positive effects on sustaining
and maximizing the resource in round one. Round one is a novel
environment in which individuals who have trained separately
learn how to play the game jointly through trial and error. Fol-
lowing the FIP, groups with high g and ToM should have better
models of the resource and social situation entering the game
and thus perform more effectively. As illustrated in Fig. 1 B and
C, this means that g and ToM should have positive direct effects
on the performance of groups in round one of the game. Pre-
diction 4: We expect g and ToM to impact the consistency of
performance through the effects of these abilities on the per-
formance of groups in round one and round one’s effect on the
consistency of performance (red path arrows in Fig. 1 B and C).
Previous studies of repeated games indicate that performance
in round one has a reputation effect on future rounds (22, 23).
Given the strong ceiling effect in the ability of groups to sus-
tain or maximize a resource (e.g., they can sustain it only for the
length of a round), the success of game play in round one should
impact how consistently groups perform over subsequent rounds.
Groups who perform well from the start should perform more
consistently because they have less room to improve and because
they establish a stronger rapport with group mates. Groups
who begin poorly should perform less consistently as learning
between rounds and perturbations lead to larger gains and losses
due to trial and error on the part of groups who have less rapport.
Prediction 5: In contrast to the indirect effects of g and ToM , we
expect g and ToM to have opposite direct effects on the abil-
ity of groups to consistently sustain and maximize the harvest of
the resource. Previous research indicates that high-g individuals
tolerate more risk than others (24, 25) and should understand
that reputation may carry over from round to round but not
the collapsed resource. Thus, groups high in g should be more
willing to harvest as much as possible and make sure that they
get “theirs” in any given round. Conversely, previous research
indicates that ToM associates with more other-regarding prefer-
ences (26) which should lead to more investment in the joint goal
of sustaining the resource. In this context, we expect groups high
in minimum ToM to be more other regarding and less sensitive
to changes in the experimental environment because they harvest
more cautiously, favoring hitting a consistent target rather than
maximizing returns in any given round per se.
Prediction 6: Fig. 1D summarizes the form of two learning
curves that we expect groups to display as they learn how to sus-
tain the resource (Time). The panel labeled negative in Fig. 1D
illustrates how we expect collective action to sustain the resource
to change over six rounds of game play when groups face an unex-
pected negative perturbation. In this case, we expect an increase
in Time , followed by a decrease immediately after the pertur-
bation itself, followed by an increase in Time . Conversely, in
the positive perturbation treatments, we expect an increase in
Time over all six rounds with negative marginal returns as groups
approach the maximum ability to cooperate. In both types of
treatments, groups high in g and ToM should display learning
curves consistently above the mean curve of all groups, whereas
groups low in both abilities should display curves consistently
below the mean. Groups specialized in g or ToM could result
in curves sometimes above or below the mean.
Results
We first summarize our results and then discuss them in detail.
In general, we find that g and ToM increase the ability of
groups to engage in collective action to sustain resources; how-
ever, only g improves the ability of groups to maximize harvest
(Fig. 2 A and B). In addition, g and ToM improve the ability of
groups to sustain resources in round one (Fig. 2C) but have lit-
tle effect on the ability of groups to maximize tokens in round
one (Fig. 2D). The performance of groups in round one has a
positive and significant effect on their ability to consistently sus-
tain the resource in subsequent rounds (Fig. 2C) but a negative
effect on their ability to consistently maximize harvest (Fig. 2D).
Finally, groups faced with a negative perturbation display a
cubic learning curve while groups faced with a positive pertur-
bation experience a continuously increasing curve with declining
marginal returns (Fig. 3). In short, the FIP helps us understand
when groups will act collectively to sustain resources but not to
maximize production.
For example, Fig. 2 illustrates the marginal effects of g and
general least squares (GLS) ToM on the average performance
of groups from two GLS regressions. In Fig. 2A, as g and ToM
increase, groups more effectively sustain the resource on aver-
age (shading becomes redder on the diagonal from left to right).
However, groups become more effective at maximizing their har-
vest, on average, only as g increases in Fig. 2B (shading becomes
redder horizontally). Fig. 2 C and D illustrates a similar result.
G and ToM have positive and significant effects on the ability
of groups to sustain the resource in round one (Time), but only
weak and insignificant direct effects on the ability of groups to
maximize production in round one (Tokens). Rather, treatment
type (positive or negative perturbation) most strongly and sig-
nificantly impacts the ability to maximize production in round
one. Groups who begin harvesting in a challenging environ-
ment do a poorer job of maximizing production (SI Appendix,
Tables S3–S8).
With respect to the consistency of performance, g and ToM
have negative and significant indirect effects on CV Time
through their effect on group performance in round one (Fig. 2C,
Ind g = −0.078, P = 0.03; Ind ToM = −0.063, P = 0.06); how-
ever, g and ToM have positive and insignificant indirect effects
on CV Tokens through their effect on group performance in
round one (Fig. 2D, Ind g = 0.009, P = 0.65; Ind ToM =
0.01, P = 0.54). The above result contrasts with the direct effects
of g and ToM on the consistency of performance. G and ToM
have weak, positive, and insignificant direct effects on CV Time .
Conversely, g has a positive and significant direct effect on
CV Tokens , and ToM has a negative and significant direct effect
on CV Tokens . This suggests that g and ToM may underlie
different preferences for maximizing returns.
7714 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1915824117 Freeman et al.
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Fig. 2. (A) Heat map of the marginal effects of g and ToM on Mtime. (B) Heat map of the marginal effects of g and ToM on Mtokens. (C and D) Path
model that describes the effects of g and ToM on the effectiveness of collective action in round one (Time and Mtokens) and the effects of g, ToM, and
performance on the coefficient of variation in performance in rounds two to six. R1 stands for round one. Standardized coefficients; significance is indicated
at ***P < 0.01 and **P < 0.05.
Finally, a cubic learning curve best fits the data in the negative
perturbation treatments (Fig. 3 A and B). In addition, in both
the “four-to-eight” group size and “high-to-low” resource treat-
ments, g and ToM have positive and significant independent
effects on the sustainability of the resource. This is consistent
with the results presented above (Fig. 2 A and C). Similarly, the
first term of the polynomial on Round significantly interacts with
g and ToM . Groups low in g and ToM actually experience faster
increases in performance between rounds one and three than
groups high in g and ToM (the red curve is steeper than the
blue curve over the first three rounds). These results are consis-
tent with our path model results above; groups with higher g and
ToM perform better in round one and have less room to improve
than groups low in these factors.
An important difference exists between the four-to-eight and
high-to-low treatments. The interaction effect between the sec-
ond term of the Round polynomial, g and ToM indicates a
negative and significant interaction in the four-to-eight treat-
ment. Groups high in ToM experience a larger decline in
performance than groups low in ToM following an increase in
group size. The impact of this decline in performance is moder-
ated by increases in g . As one moves from Left to Right across
the panels in Fig. 3A, the post–round-three dip in performance
increases in its minimum value. Low-ToM , high-g groups are
predicted to perform the best following the increase in group
size, although predicted performance subsequently converges in
rounds five and six. This is an indication of a subtle trade-off.
Groups high in ToM may be good at establishing a joint goal, and
high-g , high-ToM groups perform better until the group size per-
turbation hits. Postperturbation, high-g , low-ToM groups best
maintain collective action when group size increases. In this cir-
cumstance, specializing in g may be useful, but it will entail
worse performance early on in the game. Conversely, high-g ,
high-ToM groups sacrifice a little performance postperturbation,
but sustain the resource more consistently at a high level across
all six rounds.
Fig. 3 C and D illustrates the marginal effects of Round , g , and
ToM in the positive perturbation treatments. Consistent with
Fig. 1D, the “low-to-high” resource condition is best fitted by a
quadratic function. Conversely, the “eight-to-four” treatment is
best fitted by a cubic function. This indicates that when group
size changes from eight to four, most groups perform worse, but
then collective action begins to stabilize/recover. In both of these
treatments, the only variable that has a significant independent
effect (other than Round) is g . Groups with higher mean g scores
sustain the resource more effectively than groups with lower g .
In both of these treatments, there are no statistically significant
interactions. G and learning by doing impact the ability to sustain
the resource over time.
Discussion: Cognitive Ability–Diversity Interaction
On a planet undergoing global environmental change, the sus-
tainable governance of natural resources depends on sustained
collective action by diverse populations. Sustained collective
action to govern resources must build upon the foundations of
human cognition in social–ecological settings. In this paper, we
study the effects of two fundamental human cognitive abilities:
g and ToM . Partly consistent with the FIP, g and ToM both
have positive effects on the ability of groups to effectively and
consistently sustain a common pool resource. However, only
g has a positive and significant effect on the ability of groups
to maximize the production of the resource. Over sequential
rounds of resource management, groups consistently learn to
better govern the resource; however, especially in the negative
perturbation treatments, groups high in g and ToM sustain the
resource better than groups high in only one cognitive abil-
ity. High levels of two separate, well-defined cognitive abilities
(g and ToM ) improve the ability of groups to solve a com-
plex collective action problem. This has at least two important
implications.
First, the benefits of learning by doing have been known for
production processes for a long time (27). Learning by doing also
helps groups understand how to solve sustainability challenges;
however, learning by doing creates a fit between behavior and a
current sustainability challenge that may change over time. Our
results suggest that the configuration of a group in terms of g and
ToM significantly affects the adaptive capacity of a group to not
only learn to more effectively manage a current challenge but
also respond to changing environmental conditions. To sustain
a resource, despite perturbations, groups need to both under-
stand the resource (activate g) and form an effective joint goal
(activate ToM ). However, to maximize production, groups just
Freeman et al. PNAS | April 7, 2020 | vol. 117 | no. 14 | 7715
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Fig. 3. Three-way marginal effect plots. Green curves illustrate groups with mean ToM scores, blue curves one SD above mean ToM, and red curves one
SD below. In each set of three graphs, panels move from one SD below the mean group g score (estimated by ACT) to the mean to one SD above. (A)
Four-to-eight group size (negative) perturbation treatment. (B) High-to-low growth rate (negative) perturbation treatment. (C) Eight-to-four group size
(positive) perturbation treatment. (D) Low-to-high growth rate (positive) perturbation treatment.
need to understand how the resource works (activate g), which
implies little attention paid to the joint consequences of actions
on others. Higher g and ToM are necessary for groups to most
effectively take advantage of the benefits of learning by doing and
still respond to changing circumstances to achieve sustainability
goals.
Second, our results provide a foundation to model the joint
rather than alternative effects of cognitive abilities and other
dimensions of cognitive diversity on the capability of groups to
sustain natural resources. This framing is important to scale the
cognitive foundations of collective action up to promote large-
scale collective action among diverse populations. For instance,
Fig. 4 captures two basic postulates: 1) All else equal, the capa-
bility of groups to find solutions to sustainability challenges
increases with more diverse experiences and modes of inquiry,
which we call representational diversity, and then decreases due
to the increasing costs of representational gaps (7, 28, 29). Rep-
resentational gaps refer to how much energy it takes to get
everyone focusing on the same goal such that group effort does
not degrade into everyone working at cross-purposes (29). For
example, Aggarwal and coworkers (7) illustrate that collective
intelligence, a measure of the ability of teams to perform well on
a battery of tasks (30), first increases and then decreases with
increasing diversity in how teams represent problems (visual–
spatial vs. verbal). In short, an optimal representational diversity
exists to solve a given sustainability challenge.
2) The diversity and nonlinearity of the ecological environ-
ment (ecological complexity) and the diversity of goals and
distribution of knowledge in a system (social complexity) deter-
mine the benefits of cognitive abilities, which affects the costs
and benefits of diverse experiences and modes of inquiry. The
dashed horizontal lines in Fig. 4 that intersect the red and blue
7716 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1915824117 Freeman et al.
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Fig. 4. Hypothesized relationships among representational diversity, sus-
tainable collective action, and functionally distinct cognitive abilities.
“representational diversity–sustainability curves” illustrate this
postulate. Moving from the simpler ecological challenge (lower
purple horizontal line) to the harder challenge (upper purple
horizontal line), groups need higher g and more representa-
tional diversity to understand the dynamics of the system and
engage in effective collective action. They need higher g to bet-
ter reduce uncertainty about the ecological components of the
system and more diverse experiences and modes of inquiry to
explore a greater range of solutions, a key benefit of diverse
experiences and modes of inquiry (5). Similarly, when problems
become more complex socially, which is partly a consequence
of increasing cognitive diversity along several dimensions, even
simple ecological problems require higher ToM to achieve a
sustainable outcome (compare the lower red and blue curves
in Fig. 4). An increase in social complexity means an increase
in representational gaps as the knowledge needed to solve a
sustainability challenge becomes more fragmented, and we pro-
pose that increases in ToM reduce these representational gaps,
leading to a better-defined joint goal/preference (30, 31).
This graphic model makes testable predictions. Most rele-
vant here, when groups face more difficult ecological problems
that require collective action, they need higher g to solve such
challenges, but g is not sufficient. Such groups also need more
representational diversity to improve the ability of the group
to search for and discover appropriate solutions. Higher ToM
maximizes the benefits of such representational diversity. For
example, consider the foraging game studied in this paper. Hold-
ing treatment and the g of groups equal, we would expect
increases in representational diversity to first increase and then
decrease the ability of groups to sustain the resource, on aver-
age. The inflection point at which the performance curve peaks
is key. We expect that higher ToM moves the peak of the curve
to a higher level of representational diversity (e.g., sustainability
peaks at a representational diversity value of four as opposed to
three). One could make similar predictions across types of behav-
ioral games, holding representational diversity equal, based on
variation in the social–ecological complexity of the games.
In the end, groups with high levels of multiple intelligence
capacities (high g and ToM ) engage in more effective collective
action to sustain resources than groups with lower levels. We pro-
pose that these functional cognitive abilities moderate the effects
of cognitive diversity on the ability of groups to act collectively to
solve problems. Understanding such interactions is key to inte-
grating diverse populations at large scales to solve sustainability
challenges.
Data and Methods
The experimental common pool resource system consists of a
spatially dispersed resource (tokens) that grows according to a
density-dependent function (SI Appendix, section 1). Each par-
ticipant received $0.02 per token harvested. Thus, individuals
constantly faced the temptation to harvest tokens quickly to max-
imize their revenue in the short run. However, this strategy has a
community cost: The tokens deplete and collapse. In each treat-
ment, groups of four or eight anonymous individuals harvest
tokens for six rounds (180 s each) on a 20 × 20 grid (SI Appendix,
section 1). In the negative treatments, we evaluated the effects of
a negative change in the growth rate or an increase in group size
on the ability of groups to collectively harvest tokens. In the pos-
itive treatments, we evaluated the effect of a positive change in
the growth rate of the resource or a decrease in group size on
collective action. In all treatments individuals had the option to
communicate before each round of the game. This study com-
plied with all relevant ethical regulations for work with human
participants, informed consent was obtained by each partici-
pant, and the research was approved by the Institutional Review
Boards (IRBs) at Utah State University (protocol 7664) and at
the University of Texas at San Antonio (document HRP-522,
IRB no. 16-256).
We measured the proportion of Time per round that a group
leaves tokens in the commons to estimate how well groups sus-
tain the resource, and we measured how closely groups approx-
imated the maximum possible per person harvest of tokens
if they follow the optimal strategy (SI Appendix, section 2).
We use the coefficient of variation of Time and Tokens in
rounds two through six to measure the consistency of perfor-
mance. We calculated this for rounds two through six, excluding
round one, because we expect the performance of groups in
round one to set a baseline expectation for performance in
the following rounds. To measure g , participants were asked to
release their official ACT/SAT scores. ACT/SAT scores corre-
late highly with IQ scores and other measures of g (corrected
r = 0.86, refs. 32 and 33), which drives the predictive validity
of cognitive tests (ref. 12, pp. 270 to 301). We used equiva-
lence tables from the College Board 2016 to transform SAT
scores into ACT scores (34). To estimate group g we aver-
aged such scores at the group level. To measure ToM , each
participant completed a short story test (SST) designed to mea-
sure social reasoning (35). The SST requires reasoning about
the mental states of characters in a short story (35) and esti-
mates social–cognitive theory of mind (13). To estimate group
ToM , we used the minimum ToM score within a group, fol-
lowing the saying that one “low ToM ” can have detrimental
effects on the overall group by increasing conflict and reduc-
ing the effectiveness of joint attention (SI Appendix, section 2).
All data reported in this paper are available at https://doi.org/
10.3886/E110601V2 (36).
To assess the effect of g and ToM on Mtime and Mtokens
we used GLS regression fitted by maximum likelihood. To esti-
mate the effects of g and ToM on round one and the coef-
ficient of variation of performance in rounds two to six, we
used simultaneous equations with bootstrapped standard errors
(SI Appendix, section 3). To evaluate the functional forms of
the collective action learning curves in each specific treatment
over six rounds, we first ran GLS regressions to identify the
form of the curve that best fitted the data in each treatment
(i.e., we compared the fit of the linear, quadratic, and cubic
functions). We then built specific statistical models that inter-
acted Round , g , and ToM to evaluate whether these variables
modified the learning curves as expected. We used linear mixed-
effects models to model the effects of groups of eight in the
group size treatments (see SI Appendix, section 4 for step-by-step
details).
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Introduction
Sustaining collective action to govern natural resources in a globalizing world can only build upon the cognitive foundations of
collective action among human groups. In this paper, we focus our analysis on the effects of general and social intelligence on
the performance of small groups in a common pool resource experiment. This supplementary document provides more details
about the experiment and additional analyses that buttress the results presented in the main paper. In general, we observe
support for the Functional Intelligences Proposition (see also (1, 2)) that groups with with high general intelligence (g) and
high social intelligence (ToM) engage in more effective and consistent collective action.
Section #1 provides a more detailed description of the experiment’s design and treatments. Section #2 provides more
details on how we estimate the effectiveness of collective action in the common pool resource experiment. We also discuss how
we estimated general intelligence and social intelligence and describe other “control" factors that previous research suggests
affects the sustainable management of common pool resources. Section #3 provides additional analyses of the regression models
proposed in Fig. 1 of the main text. We provide evidence that the results are robust to adding or deleting other factors argued
to impact performance in common pool resource settings. Section #4 provides details on all of the steps involved to construct
and analyze the effects of general intelligence and social intelligence on the sustainability learning curves presented in Fig. 4 of
the main text. Section #5 provides details on recruitment for the experiment and discusses how well the sample of participants
represents the US population. Section #6 describes in more detail the short-story test and the grading of the short-story test
to estimate each participant’s theory of mind score. Finally, section #7 consists of the exit survey each participant completed
upon completing the common pool resource experiment.
1. The Experiment
To evaluate the FIP, we used a foraging game that simulates a common pool resource system (3). The common pool resource
system consists of a spatially dispersed resource (tokens) that grows according to a density dependent function. Each participant
in our experiment was paid $0.02 per unit of resource harvested (tokens). Thus, individuals constantly faced the temptation to
harvest as many tokens as they could, as quickly as they could, to maximize their revenue in the short-run. However, so doing
always has a community cost in the experiment: the resource base may be depleted quickly and collapse.
In each experimental treatment, groups of four or eight anonymous individuals harvest tokens for 6 rounds (180 seconds each)
on a 20X20 grid. Fig. S1 provides a screen shot of each participant’s view in the virtual foraging environment. Participants
can see the whole grid, and thus have information on how other individuals within their own group behave. However, they
have no information on other groups participating in an experimental session or how many rounds they would play the game.
Typical experimental sessions included 16 to 24 participants in labs with cubical computers at Utah State University (USU)
and the University of Texas at San Antonio (UTSA). Participants are assigned randomly to groups, but they can communicate
with other group members before the first round of the game and between rounds thereafter by using a chat dialog box. The
chat is anonymous - that is, one knows she is chatting with people in her group but does not know who they are.
At the beginning of each round, tokens fill 15% of the grid. Empty cells can generate tokens with probability ptok = pg∗ntok/N ,
where pg is the maximum growth rate (that changes in both the resource and the group-size treatments). In the resource
treatment the token-regeneration rate is 0.01 in the case of high growth rate, and 0.005 in the case of low growth rate. In the
group size treatment the token regeneration rate is 0.01 in the case of groups of 8 and 0.005 in the case of groups of 4. ntok =
the number of neighboring cells with tokens, and N = 8 represents the maximum number of neighboring cells that can contain
tokens. The more tokens that neighbor an empty cell, the higher the probability that the empty cell will generate a token.
Conversely, if all neighboring cells are empty, no token will grow.
A. Treatments. A critical component of the experiment is that we divided game play into two three round segments under four
treatments. These treatments either changed the group size or growth rate of tokens. The four treatments are coded in our
data repository as the High-Low Resource treatment; Low-High Resource treatment, Group1 four-eight treatment and Group2
1www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1915824117
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eight-four treatment. The High-Low Resource treatment and the Low-High Group1 treatment mimic a negative perturbation
to the system, while the Low-High Resource treatment and the High-Low Group2 treatment mimic a positive perturbation to
the system.
The software used for this experiment is open-source and available at http://commons.asu.edu. The software was modified
in order to fit our experimental needs. In all four experimental treatments, individuals were allowed to communicate before
each round of the game but were never informed about the change either in the resource growth rate nor about impending
changes in group size. In sum, the four treatments were as follows:
1. Negative Perturbation–In the High-Low Resource treatment, we evaluated the effect of a negative change in the growth
rate of the resource base on the ability of groups to collectively harvest tokens. In this treatment, individuals harvest
tokens in rounds 1-3 with a high re-growth rate (pg=0.01), and in rounds 4-6 with a low regrowth rate (pg=0.005).
2. Positive Perturbation–In the Low-High Resource treatment, we evaluated the effect of a positive change in the growth
rate of the resource base on the ability of groups to collectively harvest tokens. In this treatment, individuals harvest
tokens in rounds 1-3 with a low growth rate (pg=0.005), and in rounds 4-6 with a high growth rate (pg=0.01).
3. Positive Perturbation–In the Group2 eight-four treatment, we evaluated the effect of a reduction in group size on the
ability of groups to collectively harvest tokens. In this treatment, individuals harvest tokens in rounds 1-3 in a group of 8
participants, and in rounds 4-6 in a group of 4 participants. Note, we maintain a token growth rate scaled to group size.
A group of 8 harvests tokens at pg=0.01 and a group of 4 at pg=0.005.
4. Negative Perturbation–In the Group1 four-eight treatment, we evaluated the effect of an increase in group size on the
ability of groups to collectively harvest tokens. In this treatment, individuals harvest tokens in rounds 1-3 in a group of 4
participants, and in rounds 4-6 in a group of 8 participants.
B. Experiment Protocol. To facilitate the replication of this work we provide the code used to run the experiment here:
https://bitbucket.org/tamnguyenthe/fip-game
Fig. S2 describes the protocol used in the experiment for all treatments. After recruitment (see next section) participants
were asked to read instructions, sign a consent form, and then, if consent was given, participants were prompted to the “Read
the Mind in the Eyes Test" (RMET). After the RMET they were asked to play one of the four treatments enumerated above.
Once finished playing the 6 rounds of the actual common pool resource game, participants were asked to take the Short Story
Test (SST) and finally an exit survey.
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Fig. S2. Experiment protocol flow.
Once individuals were seated at their experimental stations, the following instructions where given:
Welcome to the Packman Game. You have completed the consent form, and you are now ready to participate. Please give your
best effort. You will receive academic credit for participating. In addition, based on your performance, you can also earn up to
$40. The experiment will take 1 to 1.5 hours, and is divided into three parts. In Part I you will complete an "eyes task". In
Part II, you will play a foraging game. In Part III you will complete a "short story task" and answer a few questions on an exit
survey. Please no talking during the experimental session. You must have completed the ACT or SAT and be 18 years or older
to participate. Thank you for your participation!
No questions from participants were allowed during the experiment to minimize facilitator interference. The following text
contains the instructions, as they appeared on screen before the common pool resource game:
In this game you will earn money for collecting tokens. The amount of money you earn depends on your decisions AND the
decisions of other people in this room over the course of playing a game described below.
How to play
You will appear on the screen as a yellow dot (avatar) with other individuals who will appear as avatars. You can move by
pressing the four arrow keys on your keyboard (see above Fig. S1 for an example of what participants would see on the screen
during the foraging game).
You can move up, down, left, or right. You have to press a key for each and every move of your yellow dot. As you move
around you can collect green diamond shaped tokens and earn two cents for each collected token. To collect a token, move your
yellow dot over a green token and press the space bar. Simply moving your avatar over a token does NOT collect that token.
Between rounds of token collecting you will have 1 minute to chat via text box.
Tokens
The tokens that you collect have the potential to regenerate. After you have collected a green token, a new token can re-appear
on that empty cell. The rate at which new tokens appear depends on the number of adjacent cells with tokens. The more
tokens in the eight cells that surround an empty cell, the faster a new token will appear on that empty cell. Existing tokens can
generate new tokens. To illustrate this, please refer to Image 1 and Image 2. The middle cell in Image 1 denoted with an X has
a greater chance of regeneration than the middle cell in Image 2. When all neighboring cells are empty, there is no chance for
regeneration.
Best Strategy
The chance that a token will regenerate on an empty cell increases as there are more tokens surrounding it. Therefore, you
want to have as many tokens around an empty cell as possible. However, you also need empty cells to benefit from this regrowth.
The best arrangement of tokens that maximizes overall regrowth is the checkerboard diagram shown below. The slower the token
regrowth, the more patient you must be in order for a token to reappear after harvest.
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2. Measuring Dependent and Independent Variables
We use four dependent variables to measure how well groups perform in the common pool resource system. The main dependent
variable is the proportion of time (T ime) per group per round that groups leave tokens in the foraging environment. For example,
if a group harvested all of the tokens in 10 seconds, they would have left tokens in the commons for 10 second/180 seconds
for a proportion of 0.05 (poor collective action).The second variable is a normalized measure of token harvest (Tokens) that
assesses the proportion of the maximum possible number of tokens per group (or how close a group is to harvesting a simulated
maximum of harvested tokens per person). We use these variable, as discussed in the main paper, to estimate group performance
on average (Mtime & Mtokens), performance in round one (R1 T ime & R1 Tokens) and performance over all six rounds. In
addition to T ime and Tokens, we calculated the coefficient of variation for T ime and Tokens over successive rounds of game
play to measure how consistently groups performed over time.
The main variable we use to measure the extent of collective action to sustain the resource is the T ime per round that
groups leave tokens on the screen. This is our preferred measure of collective action because participants must coordinate their
harvest in order to leave tokens on the screen throughout a given round. If participants do not attend to the joint goal of
waiting until near the end of a round to harvest, they will deplete the resource and cause it to collapse early in a round. The
growth function of the resource is density dependent, as specified above, and early in a round the resource is very sensitive to
harvest. Thus, even if one or two individuals decide to harvest early in the round, this can lead the resource to collapse well
before the end of a round. In addition, the T ime that groups leave tokens on a screen is comparable across treatments without
normalizing for differences in the growth rate of the resource or group size.
We analyze four dependent T ime variables. The first is simply the mean time over all six rounds that each group, regardless
of group size or growth rate, leaves tokens on the screen per round (Mtime). Mtime =0.819 in the “negative" treatments with
a standard deviation of 0.139, and Mtime =0.826 in the “positive" treatments with a standard deviation of 0.122. The second
variable is the coefficient of variation CV Time over rounds 2-6. Higher values indicate less consistent collective action and
lower values indicate more consistent collective action over rounds. We chose to use this metric of consistency because the
coefficient of variation allows us to compare across treatment types and groups. The standard deviation should technically be
understood in relationship to a group’s mean performance and comparisons across groups, especially groups from different
treatments, are less meaningful due to treatment induced differences in mean performance. Finally, we use T ime in round one
to estimate how well groups perform in the most novel situation in the experiment (round one) and T ime over all six rounds as
the dependent variable to analyze sustainability learning curves. This allows us to study how collective action to govern the
resource changes over six rounds for different treatments.
We analyze three dependent Tokens variables. One cannot simply compare the number of tokens harvested per group
member per round across treatments. This is because the growth rate of the resource and group size varies across treatments
and within treatments. To develop a comparable measure of tokens, Baggio and colleagues (2), ran simulations of the foraging
game to determine the distribution of the maximum number of tokens harvested per simulated round, given the two different
growth rates of the tokens used in the experiment. The maximum tokens (MaxT okens) is then used to determine how groups
performed in a specific round. Formally: Tokens = Actualtokens/MaxT okens where ActualT okens is the number of tokens
actually harvested by a group in a specific round. This gives us a ratio variable that typically scales between 0 and 1 (though
the value can go slightly above 1 as the simulations and real game have a stochastic element); 1 indicates maximum harvest
of tokens and 0 indicates that no one in a group harvested any tokens. Tokens, thus, estimates the ability of groups to
harvest compared to the statistical maximum identified from 1000 simulations. The variable MTokens measures the mean of
normalized token harvest per group over all six round. And CV Tokens measures the coefficient of variation of normalized
token harvest per group over rounds 2-6. As above, R1 Tokens measures the ability of groups to maximize token harvest in
round one of the game.
An important note about the two dependent variables: T ime and Tokens are positively related, but not perfectly as they
measure different aspects of performance in the commons. T ime measures the ability to coordinate harvest to leave tokens in
the commons (i.e., sustain the resource). Tokens measures the ability of groups to maximize the number of tokens collected.
Effective cooperation (higher values of T ime) is necessary to maximize Tokens, but not sufficient. For example, a group could
leave tokens on the screen at the end of a round–effectively sustaining the resource–but failing to maximize the harvest of
tokens (each round is self contained and thus no advantage exists to leave tokens unharvested). The correlation between Mtime
and Mtokens is r=0.49, p<0.05.
G, general intelligence, was estimated by official ACT/SAT scores released by the experiment participants. ACT/SAT
scores correlate with IQ scores (r = 0.86) (4–6)). Given that participants could report either SAT or ACT scores we used the
College Board equivalence tables to transform SAT into ACT scores (7) https://collegereadiness.collegeboard.org/pdf/higher-
ed-brief-sat-concordance.pdf.
ToM , theory of mind, was estimated via a short-story test first proposed by Dodell-Feder and colleagues (8). This short-story
test assigns values to an individual social reasoning ability (8). The test was taken by all participant in the experiment after
the game was played (see also S2). In short, the short story test estimates social-cognitive theory of mind, which is the ability
of individuals to assess and understand others’ attention and intentions, and consequently, allows individuals to assess and plan
joint courses of action. Social cognitive ToM allows individuals to reduce the behavioral uncertainty of others (see section
#6 for more on this test). Social-cognitive ToM is conceptually distinct from social-perceptual ToM (9), which refers to an
individual’s ability to make a snap judgment about others’ emotions from their eyes.
Following Baggio and colleagues (2), in order to assess cognitive functional diversity at the group level we use average g and
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minimum ToM . This is because g and ToM serve different functions. G relates to understanding the dynamics of a system
and this can be thought of a cumulative task (i.e., ‘I understand X, and you understand Y’, together one could argue, we
understand X+Y > X and X+Y > Y) (10). On the other hand, ToM refers to social interaction and hence the modeling
ability is akin to a conjunctive task where the minimum level of ToM determines the "tenure" of the interaction within a group
(10, 11). Groups with a high level of functional diversity, thus, have a high average g and a high minimum ToM score.
In addition to g and ToM , we control for variables found important within the literature and in previous work (2, 3, 12–16).
More precisely we control for gender (% females within a group) as well as for ethnic and religious diversity, calculated
as −Σ(Ci ∗ log(Ci)) where Ci = Ni/N represents the fraction of individuals of ethnicity or religion i within a group of N
individuals. Ethnicity, religious affiliation and gender are calculated from the survey that participants completed at the end of
the experiment session (see figure S2, as well as section #7).
Finally, we control for whether a treatment included a positive or negative shock. This is a simple dummy variable called
NegPert. 0=negative shock to the system (either an increase in group size or decline in resource growth rate; 1=positive shock
to the system (either a decrease in group size or an increase in resource growth rate). We use these variables to check the
robustness of the effects of intelligence variables on collective action and the ability to maximize harvest in the analyses below.
We control for this variable in all regressions. We also use a dummy variable to control for whether shocks were social or
ecological (SocPert). Again this is a dummy variable where 0=ecological perturbation and 1=social perturbation (change in
group size).
3. Mean and Consistent Performance Analysis
In this section, we provide supporting analyses for the results presented in Fig. 2. of the main text. Fig. 2A in the main text
illustrates the effects of g and ToM on the average proportion of time that groups left tokens in the commons over all six
rounds, Mtime (i.e., the effectiveness of collective action to sustain the resource). To analyze the effects of g and ToM on
Mtime, we used the following gls regression:
Mtime = βa + a1g + a2ToM + a3NegPert+ aiki + ε. [1]
Where βa is an unknown constant; g is general intelligence, ToM is theory of mind; NegPert is a dummy variable that codes
for either a positive or negative perturbation in round four; ki is a vector of control variables; and ε is the error term. Note, we
also used a glm model with a quasibimodal link function to regress Mtime on the predictor variables above. Qualitatively, the
results are exactly the same. This means that the direction of effects and consistency of those effects as well as significance of
those effects does not change, though the exact values and interpretations of the coefficients would change with this alternative
regression method.
Table S1. General least squares regression coefficients of predictor variables regressed on Mtime.
Model Coefficients
Predictors Intell. Model Control1 Control2 Control3 Control4 Control5 Control6 Control7 Control8 Control9 Control10
g 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.011** 0.011** 0.013*** 0.012** 0.012** 0.011** 0.012** 0.011**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ToM 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.013** 0.14*** 0.013** 0.014**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
NegPert 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.011 0.015 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.012 0.012
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
SocPert -0.023 -0.026 -0.01 -0.021 -0.021 -0.024 -0.021
(0.023) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
Gender 0.02 0.03 0.041 0.04 0.043
(0.049) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
ReligousDiv -0.047* -0.045* -0.047* -0.034
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.03)
EthnicDiv -0.03 -0.036 -0.038 -0.023
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.027)
Constant 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.40*** 0.49*** 0.48*** 0.40*** 0.49*** 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.45*** 0.48***
Model Fit
N 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122
AIC -129.24 -122.59 -123.31 -125.12 -124.14 -116.88 -118.05 -117.28 -112.60 -111.79 -105.96
Log likelihood 69.62 67.29 67.65 68.56 68.07 65.44 66.02 65.64 64.30 63.89 61.98
Note: Standard errors reported in parenthesis * = significant at the 90% level, ** = significant at the 95% level, and *** =
significant at the 99% level.
Table S1 illustrates that the results presented in the main text are robust to adding and deleting control variables. The first
column of the table presents the coefficients and standard errors of the main Intelligences Model that regresses g, ToM and
NegPert on Mtime. The results of this model are presented in Fig. 2A of the main text. The subsequent columns illustrate
coefficients, standard errors, significance values and model fits for ten control models that assess the robustness of the effects
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of ToM and g and significance of these variables to adding and deleting control variables argued to affect collective action
by previous researchers. The main result relevant to our main argument illustrated by Table S1 is that the direction and
significance of the effects of g and ToM are consistent across all models.
To analyze the effects of g and ToM on Mtokens, we used the following gls regression:
Mtokens = βa + a1g + a2ToM + a3NegPert+ aiki + ε [2]
Where βa is an unknown constant; g is general intelligence, ToM is theory of mind; NegPert is a dummy variable that codes
for either a positive or negative perturbation in round four; ki is a vector of control variables; and ε is the error term.
Table S2. General least squares regression coefficients of predictor variables regressed on Mtokens.
Model Coefficients
Predictors Intell. Model Control1 Control2 Control3 Control4 Control5 Control6 Control7 Control8 Control9 Control10
g 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.008** 0.009** 0.008** 0.009*** 0.008**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ToM 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.-0002 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.04) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
NegPert -0.009 -0.01 -0.009 -0.01 -0.013 -0.015 -0.012 -0.014 -0.012 -0.015 -0.015
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
SocPert 0.067*** 0.072*** 0.074*** 0.071*** 0.078*** 0.075*** 0.078***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.16) (0.17) (0.016) (0.016)
Gender 0.043 -0.067* -0.05 -0.056 0.052
(0.039) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035)
ReligousDiv -0.053** -0.064*** -0.061*** -0.039*
(0.02) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021)
EthnicDiv -0.057*** -0.062*** -0.06*** -0.042**
(0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019)
Constant 0.3*** 0.3*** 0.32*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.34*** 0.41*** 0.40*** 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.46***
Model Fit
N 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122
AIC -182.39 -188.08 -176.98 -181.01 -183.30 -184.60 -190.81 -191.96 -186.45 -187.57 -182.95
Log likelihood 96.16 100.04 94.49 96.50 97.65 99.30 102.40 102.98 101.22 101.78 100.47
Note: Standard errors reported in parenthesis * = significant at the 90% level, ** = significant at the 95% level, and *** =
significant at the 99% level.
Table S2 illustrates that the results presented in the main text are robust to adding and deleting control variables. As above,
the first column of the table presents the coefficients and standard errors of the main Intelligences Model that regresses g, ToM
and NegPert on Mtokens. The results of this model are presented in Fig. 2B of the main text. The subsequent columns
illustrate coefficients, standard errors, significance values and model fits for ten control models that assess the robustness of the
effects of ToM and g and significance of these variables to adding and deleting control variables argued to affect collective
action by previous researchers. The main result illustrated by Table S2 is that the direction and significance of the effect of g is
consistent across all models. Interestingly, ToM has a weak and non-significant effect across all models.
Note also, unlike our collective action dependent variable, whether groups faced a social or ecological perturbation has a
positive and significant effect on the ability of groups to maximize tokens. Groups who faced a social perturbation, on average,
were closer to maximizing harvest than groups who faced an ecological perturbation. Finally, religious and ethnic diversity
consistently have negative and significant effects on the ability of groups to maximize tokens.
A. Path models. To model the paths described by Fig. 1B and Fig. 2C and Fig. 1C and 2D in the main body of the paper, we
used the following simultaneous regression equations:
R1time = βa + a1g + a2ToM + a3NegPert+ aiki + ε [3]
CV Time = βb + b1R1time+ b2g + b3ToM + b4NegPert+ biki + ε. [4]
and
R1tokens = βa + a1g + a2ToM + a3NegPert+ aiki + ε [5]
CV Tokens = βb + b1R1tokens+ b2g + b3ToM + b4NegPert+ biki + ε. [6]
Where βi is a constant in a given regression; R1 T ime is the time groups spend with tokens on a screen in round one and
CV Time is the coefficient of variation of time with tokens on screen in rounds two-to-six; R1 tokens is number of tokens that
a group collected in round one; CV Tokens is the coefficient of variation of tokens collected between rounds two and six. G is
general intelligence; ToM is theory of mind; NegPert is a dummy variable indicating whether there was a positive or negative
perturbation on the system; and ki is a given control variable i including religious diversity, ethnic diversity and % of female
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composing a group (Gender) and whether the perturbation related to resources or group size (SocPert). To estimate these
regression equations, we used Stata Structural equation modeller and replicated the results with the Lavaan package in R. We
ran simultaneous regressions and used bootsrapped standard errors with 1000 draws for ten total regression models. The first
model, we call the Intelligence Model, does not include the four control variables used: religious and ethnic diversity, gender
composition, and whether the perturbation was related to the resources or the group size. The remaining eight control models
include various combinations of these control variables to check the robustness of the effects of g and ToM .
Tables S3, S4, S5 illustrate the standardized total, indirect and direct effects of predictor variables on the ability of groups
to sustain resources (T ime) in round one and the consistency of resource sustainability (CV Time). Both g and ToM increase
the ability of groups to sustain resources in round one. These effects are positive and significant across all control models.
Both g and ToM consistently, on average, reduce the variation of performance (i.e, reduce CV Time) through round one.
The total and indirect effects of ToM are always significant across all control models. However, only the indirect effect of g is
significant across all control models. The direction of the total effect of g on CV Time is negative across all control models,
but only significant in the Intelligence Model.
Round one also has a negative and significant effect on CV Time across all control models. This is consistent with
previous research in which group and personal characteristics may influence round one and round one then influences a group’s
performance in subsequent rounds due to reputation and reciprocity effects (12, 13, 17).
Tables (S6, S7, S8) illustrate the standardized total, indirect and direct effects of predictor variables on the ability of of
groups to maximize tokens. A noted in the main paper, only the treatment type NegPert consistently has a strong, negative,
and significant effect on the ability of groups to maximize tokens in round one. G and ToM have very weak non-significant
effects on the ability of groups to maximize the production of tokens in round one.
Again, as noted in the main paper, round one has a moderate, positive and significant effect CV Tokens. The better groups
are a t maximizing token harvest in round one, the more variable their performance in rounds two through six. G and ToM
also both indirectly increase variation in token maximization (Tokens) through their effect on round one; however, this effect
is, again, weak and not significant in any regression model.
Finally, while g directly increases variation between rounds, ToM has a dampening effect on such variation. These effects
are always significant for ToM and significant for g when the type of perturbation (whether it is centered on resource or on
group size -SocialPert-) is not taken into account. Further, religious diversity increases variability in the ability of groups to
consistently maximize tokens. Once again, the effect of religious diversity is significant only when the type of perturbation
(whether social or resource centered) is not included in a model.
To summarize, g and ToM have a significant and positive effect on the ability of groups to sustain resources in round one.
That is, groups with higher g and ToM are more able to sustain resources from the start (R1 results) and do so consistently by
reducing variation in outcomes (see negative effects of g and ToM on CV Time and R1T ime in Tables S3, S4 and S5) both
directly and indirectly. On the other hand, both g and ToM have weak and insignificant effects on the ability of groups to
maximize resource harvest in round one and consistently across rounds.
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Table S3. Standardized Total Effects of g and ToM and control variables on collective action for resource sustainability (T ime)
Predictors Intell. Model Ctr1 Ctr2 Ctr3 Ctr4 Ctr5 Ctr6 Ctr7 Ctr8
R1T ime -0.317*** -0.303*** -0.306*** -0.312*** -0.306*** -0.305*** -0.305*** -0.306*** -0.305***
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.049) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046)
g -0.150* -0.111 -0.103 -0.096 -0.102 -0.097 -0.098 -0.099 -0.113
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
ToM -0.184** -0.197** -0.176** -0.179** -0.173** -0.174** -0.176** -0.176** -0.161*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
NegPert -0.045 -0.040 -0.033 -0.035 -0.036 -0.035 -0.036 -0.036 -0.037
(0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.032) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.032) (0.033)
ReligiousDiv 0.191** 0.132 0.140 0.138 0.159 0.164 0.163 0.155
(0.039) (0.047) (0.047) (0.045) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046) (0.048)
EthnicDiv 0.119 0.126 0.126 0.125 0.114 0.113 0.113
(0.043) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.046) (0.048)
Gender -0.103 -0.107 -0.106 -0.106 -0.089 -0.098
(0.076) (0.081) (0.078) (0.075) (0.088) (0.083)
SocialPert 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.096
(0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.034) (0.037)
Dep Var: R1T ime
g 0.247*** 0.247*** 0.247*** 0.247*** 0.247*** 0.233** 0.236** 0.240** 0.285***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
ToM 0.198** 0.198** 0.198** 0.198** 0.198** 0.203** 0.209** 0.207** 0.161*
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
NegativePert -0.060 -0.060 -0.060 -0.060 -0.060 -0.061 -0.059 -0.060 -0.055
(0.060) (0.059) (0.061) (0.058) (0.062) (0.061) (0.062) (0.062) (0.061)
ReligiousDiv -0.071 -0.090 -0.085 -0.059
(0.069) (0.079) (0.082) (0.082)
EthnicDiv 0.038 0.041 0.041
(0.069) (0.072) (0.074)
Gender -0.057 -0.026
(0.132) (0.132)
SocialPert -0.217**
(0.061)
N 122.000 122.000 122.000 122.000 122.000 122.000 122.000 122.000 122.000
AIC 1278.968 1410.157 1530.372 1510.247 1673.265 1674.585 1676.442 1677.998 1673.847
RSE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.084 0.101 0.137 0.205 0.000
CFI 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.911 0.903 0.880 0.866 1.000
Note: Bootstrapped Standard errors reported in parenthesis * = significant at the 90% level, ** = significant at the 95% level,
and *** = significant at the 99% level. RSE=Residual square error, AIC = Akaike Information Criterion, CFI = Comparative
Fit Index.
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Table S4. Standardized Indirect Effects of g and ToM and control variables on collective action for resource sustainability (T ime)
Predictors Intell. Model Ctr1 Ctr2 Ctr3 Ctr4 Ctr5 Ctr6 Ctr7 Ctr8
g -0.078** -0.075** -0.076** -0.077** -0.076** -0.071** -0.072** -0.073** -0.087**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ToM -0.063* -0.060* -0.061* -0.062* -0.061** -0.062** -0.064** -0.063** -0.049**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
NegPert 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.017
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
ReligiousDiv 0.022 0.027 0.026 0.018
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
EthnicDiv -0.012 -0.013 -0.012
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Gender 0.017 0.008
(0.022) (0.022)
SocialPert 0.066
(0.013)
N 122.000 122.000 122.000 122.000 122.000 122.000 122.000 122.000 122.000
AIC 1278.968 1410.157 1530.372 1510.247 1673.265 1674.585 1676.442 1677.998 1673.847
RSE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.084 0.101 0.137 0.205 0.000
CFI 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.911 0.903 0.880 0.866 1.000
Note: Bootstrapped Standard errors reported in parenthesis * = significant at the 90% level, ** = significant at the 95% level,
and *** = significant at the 99% level. RSE=Residual square error, AIC = Akaike Information Criterion, CFI = Comparative
Fit Index.
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Table S5. Standardized Direct Effects of g and ToM and control variables on collective action for resource sustainability (T ime)
Predictors Intell. Model Ctr1 Ctr2 Ctr3 Ctr4 Ctr5 Ctr6 Ctr7 Ctr8
R1T ime -0.317*** -0.303*** -0.306*** -0.312*** -0.306*** -0.305*** -0.305*** -0.306*** -0.305***
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.049) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046)
g -0.071 -0.036 -0.027 -0.018 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
ToM -0.121 -0.137* -0.115 -0.118 -0.113 -0.112 -0.112 -0.113 -0.112
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
NegativePert -0.064 -0.059 -0.052 -0.054 -0.054 -0.054 -0.054 -0.054 -0.054
(0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032)
ReligiousDiv 0.191** 0.132 0.140 0.138 0.137 0.137 0.137 0.137
(0.039) (0.047) (0.047) (0.045) (0.047) (0.045) (0.046) (0.047)
EthnicDiv 0.119 0.126 0.126 0.125 0.125 0.126 0.125
(0.043) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.044) (0.045) (0.046)
Gender -0.103 -0.107 -0.106 -0.106 -0.106 -0.106
(0.076) (0.081) (0.078) (0.075) (0.083) (0.079)
SocialPert 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030
(0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.034) (0.036)
Constant 2.531*** 1.824* 1.635* 1.835* 1.810* 1.803* 1.805* 1.808* 1.804*
(0.168) (0.185) (0.179) (0.184) (0.187) (0.179) (0.190) (0.199) (0.188)
Dep Var:R1Time
g 0.247*** 0.247*** 0.247*** 0.247*** 0.247*** 0.233** 0.236** 0.240** 0.285***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
ToM 0.198** 0.198** 0.198** 0.198** 0.198** 0.203** 0.209** 0.207** 0.161*
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
NegativePert -0.060 -0.060 -0.060 -0.060 -0.060 -0.061 -0.059 -0.060 -0.055
(0.060) (0.059) (0.061) (0.058) (0.062) (0.061) (0.062) (0.062) (0.061)
ReligiousDiv -0.071 -0.090 -0.085 -0.059
(0.069) (0.079) (0.082) (0.082)
EthnicDiv 0.038 0.041 0.041
(0.069) (0.072) (0.074)
Gender -0.057 -0.026
(0.132) (0.132)
SocialPert -0.217**
(0.061)
Constant -1.313 -1.313 -1.313 -1.313 -1.313 -1.040 -1.098 -0.982 -0.734
(0.332) (0.338) (0.327) (0.325) (0.342) (0.365) (0.381) (0.377) (0.385)
N 122.000 122.000 122.000 122.000 122.000 122.000 122.000 122.000 122.000
AIC 1278.968 1410.157 1530.372 1510.247 1673.265 1674.585 1676.442 1677.998 1673.847
RSE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.084 0.101 0.137 0.205 0.000
CFI 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.911 0.903 0.880 0.866 1.000
Note: Bootstrapped Standard errors reported in parenthesis * = significant at the 90% level, ** = significant at the 95% level,
and *** = significant at the 99% level. RSE=Residual square error, AIC = Akaike Information Criterion, CFI = Comparative
Fit Index.
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Table S6. Standardized Total Effects of g and ToM and control variables on resource maximization (Tokens)
Predictors Intell. Model Ctr1 Ctr2 Ctr3 Ctr4 Ctr5 Ctr6 Ctr7 Ctr8
R1Tokens 0.207** 0.197* 0.204** 0.193* 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
(0.091) (0.092) (0.091) (0.093) (0.082) (0.081) (0.079) (0.083) (0.078)
g 0.187** 0.240*** 0.247*** 0.242*** 0.094 0.094 0.094 0.094 0.093
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
ToM -0.251*** -0.268*** -0.249*** -0.246*** -0.097* -0.097* -0.097* -0.097* -0.097*
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
NegPert -0.031 -0.024 -0.017 -0.016 -0.034 -0.034 -0.034 -0.034 -0.034
(0.030) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
ReligiousDiv 0.256*** 0.201** 0.195* 0.121 0.121 0.121 0.121 0.121
(0.035) (0.042) (0.042) (0.032) (0.033) (0.031) (0.030) (0.032)
EthnicDiv 0.111 0.105 0.094 0.094 0.093 0.093 0.093
(0.041) (0.039) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029)
Gender 0.086 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005
(0.065) (0.062) (0.059) (0.062) (0.057) (0.061)
SocialPert 0.705*** 0.705*** 0.705*** 0.705*** 0.707***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Dep Var: R1Tokens
g 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.051 0.046 0.039 -0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
ToM 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.055 0.043 0.047 0.089
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
NegativePert -0.528*** -0.528*** -0.528*** -0.528*** -0.528*** -0.527*** -0.531*** -0.530*** -0.535***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031)
ReligiousDiv 0.029 0.062 0.054 0.031
(0.036) (0.043) (0.045) (0.044)
EthnicDiv -0.068 -0.074 -0.073
(0.039) (0.039) (0.038)
Gender 0.096 0.069
(0.072) (0.074)
SocialPert 0.198**
(0.032)
N 122.000 122.000 122.000 122.000 122.000 122.000 122.000 122.000 122.000
AIC 1099.116 1226.533 1346.978 1327.367 1400.472 1402.330 1403.775 1404.191 1399.839
RSE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.097 0.122 0.156 0.209 0.000
CFI 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.969 0.964 0.961 0.965 1.000
Note: Bootstrapped Standard errors reported in parenthesis * = significant at the 90% level, ** = significant at the 95% level,
and *** = significant at the 99% level. RSE=Residual square error, AIC = Akaike Information Criterion, CFI = Comparative
Fit Index.
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Table S7. Standardized Indirect Effects of g and ToM and control variables on resource maximization (Tokens)
Predictors Intell. Model Ctr1 Ctr2 Ctr3 Ctr4 Ctr5 Ctr6 Ctr7 Ctr8
g 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ToM 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
NegPert -0.109 -0.104 -0.108* -0.102* -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
ReligiousDiv 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
EthnicDiv -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Gender 0.001 0.001
(0.007) (0.004)
SocialPert 0.002
(0.006)
N 122.000 122.000 122.000 122.000 122.000 122.000 122.000 122.000 122.000
AIC 1099.116 1226.533 1346.978 1327.367 1400.472 1402.330 1403.775 1404.191 1399.839
RSE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.097 0.122 0.156 0.209 0.000
CFI 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.969 0.964 0.961 0.965 1.000
Note: Bootstrapped Standard errors reported in parenthesis * = significant at the 90% level, ** = significant at the 95% level,
and *** = significant at the 99% level. RSE=Residual square error, AIC = Akaike Information Criterion, CFI = Comparative
Fit Index.
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Table S8. Standardized Direct Effects of g and ToM and control variables on resource maximization (Tokens)
Predictors Intell. Model Ctr1 Ctr2 Ctr3 Ctr4 Ctr5 Ctr6 Ctr7 Ctr8
R1Tokens 0.207** 0.197* 0.204** 0.193* 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
(0.091) (0.092) (0.091) (0.093) (0.082) (0.081) (0.079) (0.083) (0.078)
g 0.178** 0.231** 0.238*** 0.233*** 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.093
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
ToM -0.263*** -0.279*** -0.260*** -0.257*** -0.098* -0.098* -0.098* -0.098* -0.098*
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
NegativePert 0.078 0.080 0.090 0.086 -0.028 -0.028 -0.028 -0.028 -0.028
(0.032) (0.034) (0.032) (0.033) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023)
ReligiousDiv 0.256*** 0.201* 0.195* 0.121 0.121 0.121 0.121 0.121
(0.035) (0.042) (0.042) (0.032) (0.033) (0.031) (0.030) (0.032)
EthnicDiv 0.111 0.105 0.094 0.094 0.094 0.094 0.094
(0.041) (0.039) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029)
Gender 0.086 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.065) (0.062) (0.059) (0.062) (0.058) (0.061)
SocialPert 0.705*** 0.705*** 0.705*** 0.705*** 0.704***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023)
Constant -0.027 -0.977 -1.173 -1.309 -1.495* -1.495* -1.495* -1.495* -1.493*
(0.155) (0.168) (0.165) (0.166) (0.148) (0.138) (0.138) (0.146) (0.143)
Dep Var: R1Tokens
g 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.051 0.046 0.039 -0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
ToM 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.055 0.043 0.047 0.089
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
NegativePert -0.528*** -0.528*** -0.528*** -0.528*** -0.528*** -0.527*** -0.531*** -0.530*** -0.535***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031)
ReligiousDiv 0.029 0.062 0.054 0.031
(0.036) (0.043) (0.045) (0.044)
EthnicDiv -0.068 -0.074 -0.073
(0.039) (0.039) (0.038)
Gender 0.096 0.069
(0.072) (0.074)
SocialPert 0.198**
(0.032)
Constant 3.640*** 3.640*** 3.640*** 3.640*** 3.640*** 3.528*** 3.632*** 3.434*** 3.208***
(0.163) (0.171) (0.173) (0.169) (0.169) (0.186) (0.181) (0.179) (0.187)
N 122.000 122.000 122.000 122.000 122.000 122.000 122.000 122.000 122.000
AIC 1099.116 1226.533 1346.978 1327.367 1400.472 1402.330 1403.775 1404.191 1399.839
RSE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.097 0.122 0.156 0.209 0.000
CFI 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.969 0.964 0.961 0.965 1.000
Note: Bootstrapped Standard errors reported in parenthesis * = significant at the 90% level, ** = significant at the 95% level,
and *** = significant at the 99% level. RSE=Residual square error, AIC = Akaike Information Criterion, CFI = Comparative
Fit Index.
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Fig. S3. Raw best fitting collective action learning curves.
4. Collective Action Learning Curves
To evaluate the effects of g and ToM on collective action learning curves in each treatment, we followed a three step analysis.
First, we regressed Round of game play on T ime separately for each treatment and compared the fit of a linear, quadratic and
cubic model in each treatment. This allowed us to assess our predictions that negative perturbation treatments display cubic
collective action learning curves, and that the positive perturbation treatments display quadratic collective action learning
curves. Each regression was run using the general least squares method and fit by maximum likelihood estimation. Specifically,
we compared three regressions:
T ime = β0 + β1Round+ ε [7]
T ime = β0 + β1Round+ β2Round2 + ε [8]
T ime = β0 + β1Round+ β2Round2 + β3Round3 + ε [9]
where Round is the round of game play in the six session time-series, β0 is the intercept (mean T ime of Round 1), and β1 − 3
describe how the amount of T ime with tokens on the screen changes as Round of game play changes.
Tables S9–S12 compare the fits of the linear, quadratic and cubic models for each treatment. Fig. S3 displays the best
fitting curve for each treatment. Consistent with expectations documented in the main paper, a cubic collective action learning
curve best fits the negative perturbation treatments in which collective action becomes harder (‘four to eight’ and ‘high to
low’ treatments). Conversely, in the positive perturbation treatments a cubic curve best fits the data in the ‘eight to four’
treatment. This pattern contradicts our expectation of a quadratic curve. In this instance, collective action becomes easier
due to a decline in group size and groups perform a little worse, and then some groups improve again. In the ‘low to high
treatment’, a quadratic curve best fits the data, and this is consistent with our expectations.
Second, after determining the fit of the best collective action learning curve, we ran regression models with interaction
terms to assess how increases or decreases away from the mean g and ToM of groups affects collective action learning curves.
Specifically, in the resource perturbation experiments (‘high to low’ and ‘low to high’), we used general least squares regression
fit by maximum likelihood to assess the effects of g and ToM on T ime. In the case of the ‘high to low’ treatment, we fit the
following model,
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Table S9. A comparison of the fit of linear, quadratic and cubic collective action learning curves in the four to eight treatment
call Model df AIC BIC logLik Test L.Ratio p-value
Linear T ime = β0 + β1Round+ ε 1 3.00 38.85 49.14 -16.43
Quad. T ime = β0 + β1Round+ β2Round2 + ε 2 4.00 31.84 45.56 -11.92 1 vs 2 9.01 0.00
Cubic T ime = β0 + β1Round+ β2Round2 + β3Round3 + ε 3 5.00 8.74 25.89 0.63 2 vs 3 25.11 0.00
Table S10. A comparison of the fit of linear, quadratic and cubic collective action learning curves in the high to low treatment
call Model df AIC BIC logLik Test L.Ratio p-value
Linear T ime = β0 + β1Round+ ε 1 3.00 -25.89 -16.63 15.95
Quad. T ime = β0 + β1Round+ β2Round2 + ε 2 4.00 -29.61 -17.26 18.80 1 vs 2 5.71 0.02
Cubic T ime = β0 + β1Round+ β2Round2 + β3Round3 + ε 3 5.00 -31.76 -16.32 20.88 2 vs 3 4.15 0.04
Time = β0 + β1Round− β2Round2 + β3Round3 + β4g+ β5ToM + β6Round ∗ g ∗ ToM + β7Round2 ∗ g ∗ ToM + β8Round3 ∗ g ∗ ToM + ε. [10]
Similarly, for the ‘low to high’ treatment we fit,
Time = β0 + β1Round − β2Round2 + β3g + β4ToM + β5Round ∗ g ∗ ToM + β6Round2 ∗ g ∗ ToM + ε. [11]
In both cases, we used the effects package in R to calculate the marginal effects of the interactions of Round, g, and ToM .
Tables S13 and S14 display the regression coefficients, standard errors and significance of coefficients from equations (8) and
(9). In addition to the main models described in these equations, we also ran robustness checks, adding and deleting the same
control variables of religious diversity, ethnic diversity and the percent of a group composed of females noted in Section #3
above.
Table S13 illustrates that the results for the ‘high to low’ treatment discussed in the main text are robust to adding and
deleting control variables. In this ‘negative treatment’ in which a decline in growth rate during round four should make collective
action to sustain the resource harder, we observe increasing, decreasing and then increasing marginal returns consistent with
our expectation. However, when adding the intelligence variables to the regression models, only the linear term for Round
consistently displays a significant effect. Consistent with the FIP, g and ToM both have positive direct effects on T ime. These
effects are observed across all regression models and are consistent with the results presented by Baggio and colleagues (2).
However, while the effect of ToM is significant across all regression models, the significance of g does increase above p=0.1 in
four of eight regression models. Finally, the interaction of g, ToM , and Round is negative and significant across all regression
models as discussed in the main text of the paper.
Table S14 illustrates that the results for the ‘low to high’ treatment discussed in the main text are robust to adding and
deleting control variables. In this ‘positive treatment’ in which a decline in growth rate during round four should make
collective action to sustain the resource easier, we observe increasing and then decreasing marginal returns consistent with our
expectation. However, when adding the intelligence variables to the regression models, the Round variables do not consistently
display a significant effect. Partly consistent with the FIP, g has a positive direct effect on T ime. This effect is observed
across all regression models and is consistent with the results presented by Baggio and colleagues (2). However, the effect is
not statistically significant across all regression models. The effect of ToM is near zero in all regression models and never
significant.
In the group size experiments we ran mixed effects regression models fit by maximum likelihood estimation. These models
partially replicate equations (8) and (9); however, we allowed the intercepts and the slopes of the polynomials for the Round
variable to vary randomly by groups of eight. In these treatments we ran mixed effects models to control for the effect that
groups of eight may have on groups of four. As noted, we conducted our analysis on groups of four in the group size experiments
as we tracked groups of four through all six rounds. Specifically, we compared the fits of six regression models: An intercept
model; random intercept model for groups of eight; TimeRI which models the effects of Round on T ime with random intercepts
for groups of eight; TimeRI-Intell1 replicates TimeRI above with random intercepts for groups of eight and adds g, ToM
and Round*G*ToM ; TimeRI-Intell2 replicates TimeRI-Intell1 but includes an autocorrelation error function; and TimeRS
replicates TimeRI-Intell2 with the addition of random slopes for the round polynomial for groups of eight. Tables S15 & S16
present the results of an ANOVA comparing these six mixed effects models in each respective treatment. In both treatments,
the TimeRS model was the best fit, and we calculated the marginal effect of Round, g and ToM presented in the main body of
the paper from these models.
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Table S11. A comparison of the fit of linear, quadratic and cubic collective action learning curves in the eight to four treatment
call Model df AIC BIC logLik Test L.Ratio p-value
Linear T ime = β0 + β1Round+ ε 1 3.00 39.40 49.35 -16.70
Quad. T ime = β0 + β1Round+ β2Round2 + ε 2 4.00 -11.72 1.55 9.86 1 vs 2 53.11 0.00
Cubic T ime = β0 + β1Round+ β2Round2 + β3Round3 + ε 3 5.00 -25.42 -8.83 17.71 2 vs 3 15.70 0.00
Table S12. A comparison of the fit of linear, quadratic and cubic collective action learning curves in the low to high treatment
call Model df AIC BIC logLik Test L.Ratio p-value
Linear T ime = β0 + β1Round+ ε 1 3.00 26.97 36.00 -10.49
Quad. T ime = β0 + β1Round+ β2Round2 + ε 2 4.00 22.30 34.35 -7.15 1 vs 2 6.67 0.01
Cubic Time = β0 + β1Round+ β2Round2 + β3Round3 + ε 3 5.00 21.99 37.04 -5.99 2 vs 3 2.32 0.13
Table S13. General least squares regression of the collective action learning curve in the ‘high to low’ treatment
Model Coefficients
Predictors Intell. Model Control1 Control2 Control3 Control4 Control5 Control6 Control7
g 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.005 0.01* 0.006 0.007 0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
ToM 0.031*** 0.036*** 0.034*** 0.038*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Round 2.93*** 2.93*** 2.93*** 2.93*** 2.93*** 2.93*** 2.93*** 2.93***
(0.507) (0.508) (0.509) (0.503) (0.501) (0.504) (0.499) (0.500)
Round2 -0.68 -0.68 -0.68 -0.68 -0.68 -0.68 -0.68 -0.68
(0.507) (0.508) (0.509) (0.503) (0.501) (0.504) (0.499) (0.500)
Round3 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 -1.505*** 0.63 0.63
(0.507) (0.508) (0.509) (0.503) (0.501) (0.504) (0.499) (0.500)
Round : g : ToM -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Round2 : g : ToM 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Round3 : g : ToM -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Gender 0.04 0.05 0.05 -0.02
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
ReligousDiv 0.008 -0.003 0.08* 0.09*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
EthnicDiv -0.06* -0.06* -0.12*** -0.12**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Constant 0.36*** 0.33*** 0.34*** 0.48*** 0.33*** 0.45*** 0.43*** 0.43***
Model Fit
N 162 162 162 162 162 162 150
AIC -82.1 -80.72 -80.18 -83.78 -78.70 -82.54 -85.75345 -83.83
RSE 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
Note: Standard errors reported in parenthesis * = significant at the 90% level, ** = significant at the 95% level, and *** =
significant at the 99% level. RSE=Residual square error.
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Table S14. General least squares regression of the collective action learning curve in the ‘low to high’ treatment
Model Coefficients
Predictors Intell. Model Control1 Control2 Control3 Control4 Control5 Control6 Control7
g 0.018** 0.017** 0.016* 0.014 0.015* 0.014 0.014 0.013
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
ToM -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005 -0.003
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.01)
Round 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42
(0.72) (0.72) (0.72) (0.72) (0.72) (0.72) (0.72) (0.73)
Round2 -0.42 -0.42 -0.42 -0.42 -0.42 -0.42 -0.42 -0.42
(0.72) (0.72) (0.72) (0.72) (0.72) (0.72) (0.72) (0.73)
Round : g : ToM 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Round2 : g : ToM -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Gender -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07
(0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
ReligousDiv -0.049 -0.049 -0.029 -0.03
(0.057) (0.057) (0.068) (0.068)
EthnicDiv -0.05 -0.04 -0.034 -0.025
(0.05) (0.05) (0.065) (0.066)
Constant 0.42** 0.49** 0.50** 0.54** 0.57** 0.59*** 0.55** 0.60**
Model Fit
N 150 150 150 150 150 150 150
AIC 22.10 23.46 23.30 23.20 24.66 24.78 24.99 26.50
RSE 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24
Note: Standard errors reported in parenthesis * = significant at the 90% level, ** = significant at the 95% level, and *** =
significant at the 99% level.
Freeman et al. PNAS | March 11, 2020 | vol. XXX | no. XX | 17
DR
AF
T
Ta
bl
e
S
15
.
‘F
ou
r
to
ei
gh
t’
m
ul
til
ev
el
m
od
el
A
N
O
VA
ta
bl
e
ca
ll
df
A
IC
B
IC
lo
gL
ik
Te
st
L.
R
at
io
p-
va
lu
e
in
te
rc
ep
t
gl
s(
m
od
el
=
Ti
m
e
˜1
2.
00
87
.9
7
94
.8
3
-4
1.
98
ra
nd
om
In
te
rc
ep
t
lm
e.
fo
rm
ul
a(
fix
ed
=
Ti
m
e
˜1
,r
an
do
m
=
˜1
|G
p8
ID
)
3.
00
74
.8
7
85
.1
6
-3
4.
44
1
vs
2
15
.1
0
0.
00
Ti
m
eR
I
lm
e.
fo
rm
ul
a(
fix
ed
=
Ti
m
e
˜p
ol
y(
R
ou
nd
,3
),
ra
nd
om
=
˜1
|G
p8
ID
)
6.
00
-2
5.
64
-5
.0
7
18
.8
2
2
vs
3
10
6.
52
0.
00
Ti
m
eR
I_
In
te
ll1
lm
e.
fo
rm
ul
a(
Ti
m
e
˜p
ol
y(
R
ou
nd
,3
)+
g
+
To
M
+
po
ly
(R
ou
nd
,3
):g
:T
oM
,r
an
do
m
=
˜1
|G
p8
ID
")
11
.0
0
-4
2.
53
-4
.8
0
32
.2
6
3
vs
4
26
.8
8
0.
00
Ti
m
eR
I_
In
te
ll2
lm
e.
fo
rm
ul
a(
fix
ed
=
Ti
m
e
˜p
ol
y(
R
ou
nd
,3
)+
g
+T
oM
+
po
ly
(R
ou
nd
,3
):g
:T
oM
,r
an
do
m
=
˜1
|G
p8
ID
,c
or
re
la
tio
n
=
co
rA
R
1(
))
12
.0
0
-5
9.
97
-1
8.
82
41
.9
8
4
vs
5
19
.4
4
0.
00
Ti
m
eR
S
lm
e.
fo
rm
ul
a(
fix
ed
=
Ti
m
e
˜p
ol
y(
R
ou
nd
,3
)+
g
+
To
M
+
po
ly
(R
ou
nd
,3
):g
:T
oM
,r
an
do
m
=
˜p
ol
y(
R
ou
nd
,3
)|
G
p8
ID
,c
or
re
la
tio
n
=
co
rA
R
1(
))
21
.0
0
-5
7.
52
14
.5
0
49
.7
6
5
vs
6
15
.5
5
0.
08
18 | Freeman et al.
DR
AF
T
Ta
bl
e
S
16
.
‘E
ig
ht
to
fo
ur
’m
ul
til
ev
el
A
N
O
VA
ca
ll
df
A
IC
B
IC
lo
gL
ik
Te
st
L.
R
at
io
p-
va
lu
e
in
te
rc
ep
t
gl
s(
m
od
el
=
Ti
m
e
˜1
)
2.
00
70
.7
9
77
.4
3
-3
3.
40
ra
nd
om
In
te
rc
ep
t
lm
e.
fo
rm
ul
a(
fix
ed
=
Ti
m
e˜
1
ra
nd
om
=
˜1
|G
p8
ID
)
3.
00
71
.8
4
81
.7
9
-3
2.
92
1
vs
2
0.
95
0.
33
Ti
m
eR
I
lm
e.
fo
rm
ul
a(
fix
ed
=
Ti
m
e
˜p
ol
y(
R
ou
nd
,3
),
ra
nd
om
=
˜1
|G
p8
ID
)
6.
00
-3
1.
97
-1
2.
06
21
.9
8
2
vs
3
10
9.
81
0.
00
Ti
m
eR
I_
In
te
ll1
lm
e.
fo
rm
ul
a(
fix
ed
=
Ti
m
e
˜p
ol
y(
R
ou
nd
,3
)+
g
+
To
M
+
po
ly
(R
ou
nd
,3
):g
:T
oM
,r
an
do
m
=
˜1
|G
p8
ID
)
11
.0
0
-2
9.
70
6.
80
25
.8
5
3
vs
4
7.
73
0.
17
Ti
m
eR
I_
In
te
ll2
lm
e.
fo
rm
ul
a(
fix
ed
=
Ti
m
e
˜p
ol
y(
R
ou
nd
,3
)+
g
+
To
M
+
po
ly
(R
ou
nd
,3
):g
:T
oM
,r
an
do
m
=
˜1
|G
p8
ID
,c
or
re
la
tio
n
=
co
rA
R
1(
))
12
.0
0
-3
3.
88
5.
94
28
.9
4
4
vs
5
6.
18
0.
01
Ti
m
eR
S
lm
e.
fo
rm
ul
a(
fix
ed
=
Ti
m
e
˜p
ol
y(
R
ou
nd
,3
)+
g
+
To
M
+
po
ly
(R
ou
nd
,3
):g
:T
oM
,r
an
do
m
=
˜p
ol
y(
R
ou
nd
1,
3)
|G
p8
ID
,c
or
re
la
tio
n
=
co
rA
R
1(
))
21
.0
0
-8
5.
14
-1
5.
46
63
.5
7
5
vs
6
69
.2
6
0.
00
Freeman et al. PNAS | March 11, 2020 | vol. XXX | no. XX | 19
DR
AF
T
Table S17 illustrates the fixed, random effects and model fits of the ‘four to eight’ mixed effects regression for eight regression
models. The first model, as above, is the Intelligence Model (TimeRS in Table S15). The remaining seven control models
add and delete gender composition, religious diversity and ethnic diversity from the TimeRS mixed effects regression model
specified in Table S15. Table S17 illustrates that the fixed effects of g and ToM are positive across all regression models.
Further, the interaction between Round, g and ToM is negative and significant across all regression models. The interaction
between Round2, g and ToM is also negative and significant across all regression models presented in Table S17.
Table S17. The fixed and random effects coefficients of the collective action learning curve in the ‘four to eight’ treatment
Fixed Coefficients
Predictors Intell. Model Control1 Control2 Control3 Control4 Control5 Control6 Control7
g 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.020*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.026***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
ToM 0.012* 0.013* 0.01 0.013* 0.009 0.013* 0.010 0.010
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Round 4.15*** 4.15*** 4.13*** 4.15*** 4.13*** 4.14*** 4.13*** 4.13***
(0.592) (0.594) (0.592) (0.503) (0.519) (0.593) (0.590) (0.592)
Round2 -1.95*** -1.95*** -2.00*** -1.96*** -2.00*** -1.96*** -2.00*** -2.00***
(0.585) (0.586) (0.584) (0.582) (0.585) (0.587) (0.584) (0.585)
Round3 1.49** 1.49** 1.44** 1.48** 1.44** 1.48* 1.44** 1.44**
(0.628) (0.629) (0.628) (0.628) (0.630) (0.630) (0.629) (0.630)
Round : g : ToM -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Round2 : g : ToM 0.007** 0.007** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Round3 : g : ToM -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Gender 0.011 0.011 0.011 -0.011
(0.066) (0.066) (0.062) (0.066)
ReligousDiv 0.04 0.045 0.041 0.044
(0.04) (0.047) (0.045) (0.048)
EthnicDiv 0.02 0.022 0.021 0.021
(0.03) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032)
Constant 0.12 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.06 0.06
Random Effects
θ2Intercept 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13
θ2Round 0.66 0.67 0.70 0.66 0.7 0.66 0.69 0.70
θ2
Round2
0.63 0.63 0.66 0.64 0.66 0.64 0.67 0.66
θ2
Round3
0.95 0.95 0.99 0.95 0.99 0.95 0.99 0.99
Model Fit
N 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 228
AIC -57.51 -55.52 0.13 -56.01 5.66 -54.04 6.77 12.29
Log Likelihood 49.75 49.76 21.93 50.00 20.16 50.02 19.61 17.85
Note: Standard errors reported in parenthesis * = significant at the 90% level, ** = significant at the 95% level, and *** =
significant at the 99% level.
Fig. S4 illustrates the predicted fits of the Intelligence regression model with random intercepts and slopes overlaying the
actual data for every group of four and eight. There are 38 groups of four in the dataset and 19 groups of eight. Each panel of
the graphic describes how T ime changed over six rounds for each group of four, and each pair of windows illustrates groups of
eight. For example, during rounds 1-3, groups 1 and 2 (panels 1 and 2 in the graphic) played the game as a group of four. In
round four, these two groups combined into a group of eight. This pattern holds for the entire graphic, groups 3 and 4 became
a group of 8 in round 4, 5 and 6 the same, and so on. The bottom line is that a cubic function is a good fit for many groups of
four, with a decline in performance following the shift to a group of eight, and then an increase in performance as the group of
eight readjusted to the larger group size.
Table S18 illustrates the fixed, random effects and model fits of the ‘eight to four’ mixed effects regression for eight regression
models. The first model, as above, is the Intelligence Model (TimeRS in Table S15). The remaining seven control models
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Fig. S4. The predicted curves of the mixed effects model in the four to eight treatment plotted over the actual data.
add and delete gender composition, religious diversity and ethnic diversity from the TimeRS mixed effects regression model
specified in Table S15. Table S18 illustrates that the fixed effects of g is positive and significant across all regression models.
Further, the effects of the Round polynomial are statistically significant across all regression models. The interaction between
the Round terms, g and ToM is not statistically significant in any of the models. As with the ‘low to high’ treatment reported
above, ToM has a negligible fixed effect across regression models reported in S18.
Fig. S5 illustrates the predicted fits of the Intelligence regression model with random intercepts and slopes overlaying the
actual data for every group of four and eight. There are 34 groups of four in the dataset and 17 groups of eight. Each panel of
the graphic describes how T ime changed over six rounds for each group of four, and each pair of windows illustrates groups of
eight. For example, during rounds 1-3, groups 1 and 2 (panels 1 and 2 in the graphic) played the game as a group of eight. In
round four, these two groups split into two groups of four. This pattern holds for the entire graphic; groups 3 and 4 became a
group of 8 in round 4, groups 5 and 6 the same, and so on. The bottom line is that groups display a lot of variability after the
group size change from eight to four. Over the fist three rounds, almost every group of eight improves their collective action to
sustain the resource without fail. However, once the positive perturbation hits and group size decreases to four, some groups
continue to sustain the resource well, while others perform more poorly. This visual observation is consistent with the results
presented in the path analysis in which treatment type (0=negative, 1=positive) has a negative and significant effect on both
the robustness of T ime and Tokens. Groups in the positive treatments display more variability round to round and between
groups than groups in the negative perturbation treatments.
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Table S18. The fixed and random effects coefficients of the collective action learning curve in the ‘eight to four’ treatment
Fixed Coefficients
Predictors Intell. Model Control1 Control2 Control3 Control4 Control5 Control6 Control7
g 0.016*** 0.015** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.015** 0.017*** 0.016**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
ToM -0.0007 0.00008 -0.0007 -0.0001 0.009 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Round 1.22** 1.22** 1.22** 1.22** 1.22** 1.22** 1.21** 1.21**
(0.583) (0.584) (0.584) (0.583) (0.585) (0.584) (0.584) (0.585)
Round2 -2.04*** -2.05*** -2.04*** -2.03*** -2.04*** -2.03*** -2.03*** -2.04***
(0.508) (0.509) (0.510) (0.509) (0.511) (0.510) (0.510) (0.511)
Round3 0.73* 0.73* 0.73* 0.74* 0.73* 0.74* 0.74* 0.74*
(0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44)
Round : g : ToM 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Round2 : g : ToM 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Round3 : g : ToM 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Gender 0.049 0.034 0.052 0.038
(0.054) (0.066) (0.054) (0.054)
ReligousDiv -0.051* -0.047 -0.047 -0.042
(0.03) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032)
EthnicDiv -0.023 -0.025 -0.017 -0.019
(0.028) (0.027) (0.020) (0.027)
Constant 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.47*** 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.48*** 0.48***
Random Effects
θ2Intercept 0.07 0.07 0.067 0.07 0.067 0.07 0.068 0.067
θ2Round 1.53 1.53 1.53 1.53 1.53 1.53 1.53 1.53
θ2
Round2
1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12
θ2
Round3
0.56 0.56 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.55
Model Fit
N 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204
AIC -85.02 -83.85 -85.57 -83.76 -83.97 -82.75 -83.96 -82.48
Log Likelihood 63.51 63.92 64.78 63.88 64.98 64.37 64.98 65.24
Note: Standard errors reported in parenthesis * = significant at the 90% level, ** = significant at the 95% level, and *** =
significant at the 99% level.
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Fig. S5. The predicted curves of the mixed effects model in the eight to four treatment plotted over the actual data.
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5. Recruitment for the Experiments
We recruited 550 undergraduate students from two universities: Utah State University (USU) and the University of Texas
at San Antonio (UTSA). 216 participants participated in the resource treatments, and 334 individuals participated in the
group size treatments. We recruited students at UTSA from the introductory psychology participation pool. The introductory
psychology participation pool draws students from approximately 8 introductory psychology courses at over 100 students per
course where students complete studies for partial credit toward course completion. These introductory courses draw students
from across the university. At USU, we recruited students from introductory sociology and anthropology courses that have
over a 150 students enrolled per course. These courses are general requirement courses and draw students from all majors
represented at the university. Participation in the study was voluntary and students could withdraw participation at any time.
All participants received course credit for participation and a cash payout that depended on how many tokens they collected
over six rounds.
A. External Validity. Experimental studies, especially when performed within universities, can have issues with external validity:
How well does the sample population represent the population of interest? Here we compare our sample population with the
U.S. population to assess how well we are capturing wider characteristics of interest. We use the CIA Factbook, retrieved from
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html to compare general demographic data, such as
ethnic diversity, religious diversity, gender composition and age.
A.1. Demographics. The tables below portray our sample summary statistics as well as distribution for Ethnic and Religious
Diversity. According to the data retrieved from the CIA factbook, within the U.S. Ethnic Diversity is, overall, 0.970, however,
including Hispanic, ethnic diversity displays a value of 1.289. Our sample population displays an ethnic diversity index of
0.55 on average, while 50% of the groups within our sample population display an ethnic diversity index of 0.562. The sample
population is thus more homogeneous, from an ethnic point of view, than the U.S. population. However, it is also true that
over 30% of groups participating within the experiment display an ethnic diversity in line with the U.S. population (26.61% of
groups had an ethnic diversity index of 1.04 and 6.45% of groups had an ethnic diversity index of 1.386, both in line with
the U.S. data between 0.97 and 1.23 depending on whether Hispanic is included or not). Note that the CIA factbook does
not directly report Hispanic population but gives estimates, here the estimates were used to calculate Hispanic population by
proportionally reducing black and white populations.
Summary Statistic Ethnic Diversity Religious Diversity
N 122 122
Mean 0.550 0.867
Std. Dev. 0.042 0.038
25th Percentile 0.000 0.562
Median 0.562 1.040
75th Percentile 1.040 1.040
Min 0.000 0.000
Max 1.386 1.386
Ethnic Diversity Percent
0.000 36.29
0.562 21.77
0.693 8.87
1.040 26.61
1.386 6.45
On average, we find that our religious diversity is very much in line with the average religious diversity within the wider U.S.
population. In fact, our average religious diversity metric (0.867, median 1.04) is similar with the average religious diversity
index calculated for the whole U.S., where the religious diversity index is 0.79 grouping Christians together, and 1.38 keeping
Christian religious affiliations separated. Note that these results are very much in line with our sample, where over 33.06% of
groups displayed a religious diversity index of 1.04, and 24.19% of the groups displayed a diversity index of 1.386.
Religious Diversity Percent
0.000 10.48
0.652 27.42
0.693 4.84
1.040 33.06
1.386 24.19
With respect to Age, our sample is skewed towards a younger population. This is a bias that is almost impossible to
eliminate when performing behavioral experiments within the university context, where undergraduate populations are sampled.
However, the results of the study are still valuable. The results provide a firmer basis for conducting more experiments with a
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Fig. S6. Distribution of group general intelligence (avg g) within the sample population.
wider range of age cohorts. Finally, our sample displays a higher gender imbalance as 62.5% of participants self-identified as
females, compared to the general U.S. female population that represent 50.1% of the overall population.
Overall, although with some issues with respect to age and gender, our sample population reflects the diversity seen within
the wider U.S. population.
A.2. g and ToM. With respect to g, as Fig. S6 shows, the participants in the experiment have on average higher g than the
general population. With respect to ToM , this is difficult to assess as no US or other whole population data are available.
However, ToM is moderately correlated with the personality trait of agreeableness (see (1) as well as Nettle and colleagues
(9)). ToM in our sample population is depicted in Fig. S7.
6. Short Story Test
In the Short Story Task (SST), participants read "The End of Something", a short story by Ernest Hemingway, which presents a
nuanced interaction between a romantic couple in which the male protagonist, Nick, starts an argument and breaks up with his
girlfriend, Marjorie. Through the course of the story, the characters display sarcasm, non-verbal and indirect communication,
higher-order emotions like guilt, and attempts to hide their intentions and feelings from one another.
According to Dodell-Feder (8), the goal of the SST was to
"to design a new ToM task (the Short Story Task -SST-) that improved upon the limitations of existing ToM
measures. More specifically, we aimed to create a task that (a) was sensitive to individual differences in ToM
ability and did not suffer from ceiling effects, (b) incorporated a range of mental states of differing complexity,
including epistemic states, affective states, and intentions to be inferred from a first- and second-order level, (c)
used ToM stimuli representative of real-world social interactions, (d) required participants to utilize social context
when making mental state inferences, (e) exhibited adequate psychometric properties, and (f) was quick and easy
to administer and score." (8, p. 2)
A. Short Story Test instruction and questions. Instructions to Participant
Now you are going to read a short story called The End of Something. The story is only a few pages, but take your time
reading it. Try to get a sense of what happens and what the relationships are between the characters. After you’re finished,
some questions will appear on the screen and you will be asked to answer them.
After story is read
1. Have you read this story before? [yes | no]
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• IF YES
– How long ago did you read it?
– How well do you remember the story?
– Did you read it for school or pleasure?
∗ IF SCHOOL
· What grade were you in?
· What class was it for?
2. Is the story familiar to you? [yes | no]
• IF YES
– Do you know anything about the story? What do you know about it?
– Have you discussed the story with anyone?
Instructions to Participant Now I’m going to ask you some questions about the story. Here is a copy of the questions
I’ll be asking so you can read along. For most of the questions, there are no right or wrong answers and the questions can be
answered with short responses. We’re also interested in the character’s thoughts, feelings and intentions when it applies to the
question.
Questions
1. In just a few sentences, how would you summarize the story
2. What do Nick and Marjorie observe on the shoreline as they are rowing to the point to set their fishing lines?
3. What does Nick mean when he says, "They aren’t striking?"
4. Nick and Marjorie have a pail of perch for what purpose?
5. Do Marjorie’s actions suggest that she is experienced or inexperienced at fishing? What makes you say that?
6. Why does Nick say to Marjorie, "You know everything"?
7. Why does Marjorie reply, "Oh Nick, please cut it out! Please, please don’t be that way!"?
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8. Why is Nick afraid to look at Marjorie?
9. What does Nick mean when he says, "It isn’t fun anymore"?
10. Why does Marjorie sit with her back toward Nick when she asks, "Isn’t love any fun?"?
11. Why does Marjorie take the boat and leave and what is she feeling at that moment?
12. Who is Bill and what does he reveal when he asks Nick, "Did she go alright? ... Have a scene?"?
13. What is Nick feeling when he says, "Oh, go away, Bill! Go away for a while"?
14. The story is called "The End of Something." What is the title referring to?
A.1. Scoring the Short Story Test. Scoring for the SST followed the methodology of (8). Three different coders coded the answer
to the SST independently. We calculated Krippendorff’s alpha using ordinal data using ReCal online. Krippendorff’s alpha
(ordinal) was 0.833, demonstrating a high level of coders agreement. As the SST was consistently coded with three coders,
all questions that did not have 100% agreement among coders was coded as the score issued by the majority of coders. If a
question did not have a majority (all coders issued different scores) disagreements were resolved via discussion between all
coders.
The following is the coding sheet used by the coders. Explicit mental state reasoning (in bold) is the metric used to assess
Social Intelligence.
• Comprehension: Sum scores of 5 comprehension questions (questions 2, 3, 4, 5, and 14). Ranges from 0 to 10.
• Explicit mental state reasoning: Sum scores of 8 mental state reasoning questions (questions 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
and 13). Ranges from 0 to 16.
• Spontaneous mental state inference: 1 score for spontaneous mental state question (question 1). Ranges from 0 to 1.
Following are examples of coding used to evaluate and score the three components of the test described above.
• Question 1: 1 = any mental state inference, even if it is wrong
• Question 2: 2 = any adjective + mill 1 = only mill 0 = anything else
• Question 5: 2 = experienced 2 or 1 = somewhat experienced / somewhat inexperienced 2 for good justification 1 for bad
/ no justification 1 or 0 = inexperienced 1 for good justification 0 for bad / no justification
• Question 6: 0 = anything that does not understand that he’s being sarcastic, anything that thinks he’s joking, anything
that thinks that she does actually know everything
• Question 7: 2 = if they understood that he was giving her a hard time or doing something that was not intended to
make her happy
• Question 8: 2 = anything that references her reaction / emotions 1 = anything that references his reaction / emotions
without referencing hers 0 = no mention of an emotion
• Question 10: 2 = knows about break up / something bad (may include emotion) 1 = emotion with no knowledge of
breakup / something bad 0 = No emotion, No knowledge about break up / something bad
• Question 11: 2 = (either the relationship is over or wanting space) AND negative emotion 1= upset OR wants space
• Question 12: 2 = Bill’s relationship with Nick AND anything that references Bill’s advanced knowledge 1 = Bill’s
relationship with Nick OR directly states Bill knew Nick was going to break up with Marjorie (Bill is not in the clearing
while Nick and Marjorie fight and/or break up. He enters later.)
• Question 13: 2 = negative emotion referencing break up AND needs space / doesn’t want to talk 1 = negative emotion 0
= no negative emotion, only wants space
• Miscellaneous: As long as a correct answer is present (even if a patently wrong answer is also present), give the score for
the correct answer. Anything that is obviously wrong (outside of question 1) should be scored as 0.
Freeman et al. PNAS | March 11, 2020 | vol. XXX | no. XX | 27
DR
AF
T
7. Survey
Participants filled out the following exit survey to collect data researchers have identified as relevant for explaining performance
on common pool resource experiments in the past (3, 18, 19). They survey also was used to collect basic demographic
information.
1. Please report your age in years.
2. Please provide your current GPA
3. Please describe your religious affiliation, if any. Please be as specific as possible.
4. What is your primary language?
5. Please specify how you identify your race or ethnicity.
6. Please indicate the number of individuals who you call close friends? Please exclude family members and mere
acquaintances.
7. How many individuals are in your total social network (i.e., close friends plus family members plus acquaintances)?
8. Please write the typical number of individuals who lived in your home while you were between the ages of 5-17?
9. Please estimate the median household income of the family in which you lived between ages of 5-17?
10. What is your college major or intended college major?
11. Please circle the descriptor that best describes your biological sex?
• M
• F
12. Did you understand the instructions of the exercises?
• I did not understand anything I understood only a bit of the instructions
• I understood half of the instructions
• I understood most of the instructions
• I understood everything
13. Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they had a chance, or would they try to be fair?
• Would take advantage of you
• Depends on situation
• Would try to be fair
14. Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?
• Try to be helpful
• Depends on situation
• Mostly just looking out for themselves
15. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with
people?
• Most people can be trusted
• Depends on situation
• Can’t be too careful in dealing with people
16. In the past year, did you do any volunteer activity through organizations; i.e. donate your time and energy not for pay?
• Yes
• No
17. Global warming is a fact and is mostly caused by emissions from vehicles and industrial facilities?
• I completely agree
28 | Freeman et al.
DR
AF
T
• I somewhat agree
• I have no opinion
• I somewhat disagree
• I completely disagree
18. Tell me whether the first statement or the second statement comes closer to your own views ? even if neither is exactly
right.
• Most people who want to get ahead can make it if they’re willing to work hard.
• Hard work and determination are no guarantee of success for most people.
19. Tell me whether the first statement or the second statement comes closer to your own views ? even if neither is exactly
right.
• The government should do more to help needy Americans, even if it means going deeper into debt.
• The government today can’t afford to do much more to help the needy
20. Here are two statements people sometimes make when discussing the environment and economic growth. Which of them
comes closer to your own point of view?
• Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs.
• Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent.
21. What is the highest educational level that your Parents have attained?
22. What is your Father’s occupation?
23. What is your Mother’s occupation?
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